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bstract: The aim of this paper is to find out to what extent the accession 
countries will be able to benefit from an increase in the quality of foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) that they receive due to EU membership. 
Although there will be some investment in new affiliates resulting in greenfield 
subsidiaries, transnational companies (TNCs) may divest their operations in 
response to better location advantages elsewhere in the EU (as Spain and 
Portugal are experiencing because their low-cost advantages are eroded). In many 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the share of foreign ownership in 
total capital stock is already typically much higher than in older EU member states, 
but we can already observe a trend of relocating TNCs’ subsidiaries to other 
emerging countries in order to diminish the costs, in the context of the present crisis 
and we believe that this trend will continue in the future, especially in the crisis 
context when the inceptive burden is heavy for governments. The conclusion of this 
paper is that the CEE countries haven’t faced quite similar conditions as the 
Southern European countries that acceded to the EU in the ‘80s. So, their benefits 
have considerably diminished and the present crisis didn’t help them at all to 
reduce their economic gaps comparing to the developed European countries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
European countries consider foreign direct investments (FDIs) as an 
indispensable part of their development strategy. Many of the less economically 
developed, older member states of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain (referred to here as the ‘cohesion’ countries) followed this approach, 
and, partly as a result of their success, these investment policies have been 
pursued much more explicitly by the new member states (NMS) and those 
wishing to join, a large number of both groups being located in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) (referred to in this paper either as the accession countries 
or CEE countries, irrespective of their membership status) (Narula and Bellak, 
2009).  However, our aim is to discuss broader aspects that are similar and 
relevant to all countries, rather than particular aspects and policy implications for 
individual countries. This paper will discuss the costs, benefits, opportunities and 
limitations of an FDI-based industrial development strategy in these countries, 
based on the findings in the economic literature and analyzing statistic data 
available to the European countries discussed in the paper. Those findings and 
the statistic data analysis are important for an empiric research elaborated for 
Romania that will be made in a further article. The present paper represents the 
base for a further research on Romania within a research project that tests the 
impact of the financial macroeconomic policies on FDIs in Romania for designing 
the Romanian investment policy in the future and for achieving sustainable 
economic growth. 
EU membership has two important implications regarding FDIs. First, it allows 
countries that have small domestic markets to expand their market and to attract 
European funds for investments (in agriculture, infrastructure). However, as the 
number of countries in the EU increases, this advantage is currently shared by 
27 member countries. Thus, this advantage has considerably less value to the 
accession countries than it had for the cohesion countries, and this is 
exacerbated by the fact that domestic firms in many of the CEE countries have 
little experience in dealing with competition in a market economy which further 
attenuates the benefits derived from the competition effect. 
Second, membership suggests political, economic and legal stability, but the 
absence of efficient institutions can delay the effective accumulation and transfer 
of knowledge. EU accession countries are not competing with the least 
developed countries for FDI. Moreover, in the crisis context, we cannot talk about 
stability in the EU area, because there are important ties between the EU 
member states and the crisis affects all member states at some level. EU  FDIs and investment policy in some European countries 
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membership doesn’t mean that all member states are economically similar, only 
Eurozone members seem to be present more similar economic conditions.  
Section 2 presents the FDIs evolutions after the accession of some European 
countries from the South of Europe or from the Central and Eastern Europe to 
the EU. We consider some benefits and costs of EU accession and the limits of 
applying cohesion countries’ experience in the CEE area. Section 3 presents 
some economic developments in the analyzed countries during the crisis period 
and some measures adopted here against crisis effects. Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
2. FDIs IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER THEIR ACCESION 
TO THE EU 
In 1995 the transition period of the Central and East European countries 
practically came to an end. One main factor of the transition was the massive 
privatization process, where foreign capital played a vital role. The inflow of FDI 
was bound to privatization deals. Later, as the number of these deals decreased, 
foreign investments took other forms. FDI was a mean of integration of these 
countries into the EU and Western markets (Elteto, 2010). 
For the year 2000 FDI stock as a share in the GDP reached between 20-30 
percent in Bulgaria and Slovakia, which figure can be compared to that of Spain. 
Romania and Poland were close to 20 percent and the highest levels were 
achieved by the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
 
Table 1. FDI in percentage of GDP during 1995-2000 
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The share of FDI was outstandingly high in Hungary during the whole period, 
reaching 47% in 2000. Slovenia, Romania and Poland remained below 20 
percent, but the latter two showed also a rapid increase in FDI inflow (Table 1). 
Regarding FDI attraction, in the CEE region, the situation presented different 
features. The so-called “Visegrád” countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary) were more “popular” than the others. Resmini (2005) underlined 
certain features of foreign investment firms’ activity in the nineties: 
•  The most important recipient countries are Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland lag behind, but this situation reversed in the 
last decade. 
•  Romania however is attractive for firms involved in labour-intensive production, 
while the most advanced countries emerge as favourite location for high-tech 
foreign firms. 
•  Foreign firms are concentrated mainly in the capital districts and Western parts 
of the countries, while the Eastern and Southern areas are less popular. 
Thus FDI contributed to a certain extent to regional imbalances, favoring the 
most developed areas in the given countries. Certainly, the quality of 
infrastructure and labour force were here better than elsewhere, being important 
location factors for foreign investors. 
Lankes and Venables, 1996, and Éltető and Sass, 1998, showed that for the 
market-oriented investors the local market size and potential was the most 
important driving factor and for export-oriented investors the availability and cost 
of qualified work force was important. Bellak et al. (2008) analyse the role of 
labour costs as a determinant of FDI in the CEE countries. Their results show 
that FDI in the CEE countries are driven by total labour costs as well as labour 
productivity. Labour productivity grew rapidly in the CEE countries. The 
productivity was particularly high in the technology-intensive sectors (machinery, 
electrical, optical and transport equipment). The main reason for this is that in 
these sectors the initial gap in productivity was larger. This growth and the 
availability of skilled, educated labour force attracted FDI, mainly towards higher 
tech sectors (Elteto, 2010). 
Economic development in Spain was helped by FDI. During the eighties this was 
one of the countries that attracted the highest amount of foreign direct 
investment. Spanish services and financial sectors were the most attractive aims 
for foreign investors, but in the latenineties the position of the industry as a 
destination of FDI strengthened. The food, electronic, automobile, chemical  FDIs and investment policy in some European countries 
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branches were the manufacturing sectors most favoured by FDI (Éltető, A., 
2010). 
Beside the inflow of FDI, Spanish investments abroad also began to rise already 
during this period. The characteristics of Spanish outward investment at thas 
time were the following: a few number of large company deals, dominance of the 
services sector, geographic direction concentrates on the old EU members or 
Latin America. Approximately 45% of Spanish investments were directed 
towards Latin-American countries, utilizing the privatization possibilities, gaining 
new markets (Gordo, 2008). Spanish companies used the location advantages in 
these countries, mainly the common language, cultural and historical ties. 
Cultural link including language played an important role in the location choices 
of Spanish multinational companies. 
From the mid-1990s to 2008, the Spanish economy enjoyed a sustained 
economic growth when real convergence with the core EMU member countries 
advanced notably. This expansionary phase was mostly driven by two factors. 
First, by a significant expansion of credit, which was induced by the fall in 
interest rates that followed Spain’s adhesion to the EMU and by a pervasive 
relaxation in conditions of access to credit that helped economic growth. And 
second, by the large immigration inflows into Spain over the period that 
substantially modified the demographic structure of the Spanish population. But 
the consequences were not good. The Spanish economy became increasingly 
dependent on external financing over the period and the Spanish current account 
deficit increased in the last decade. The price-competitiveness of the Spanish 
economy also deteriorated, due to very low productivity growth and to the 
existence of important distortions in the domestic labor and product markets 
(Gavilan et al., 2011). 
There seems to be a relatively clear division between investment policies of the 
CEE countries and of the Western European Countries of the EU. While the 
former may gain most by focusing on infrastructure and R&D policies, the latter 
group’s policies to reduce the share of low-skilled workers, for example, by 
encouraging firms to restructure production and increase capital intensity and 
through a reduction in labour costs via a decrease in non-wage-labour costs, 
would attract most FDI (Ionita, L. and Pauwels, S., 2008). 
The years after 2000 brought important changes in the economy and the 
institutional system of the countries. Spain became a member of the Economic 
and Monetary Union and introduced the euro in 2002. For the CEE countries the 
most significant historical event was that the countries became members of the  Magdalena RĂDULESCU, Elena Nolica DRUICĂ 
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European Union in 2004. The membership was an attractive factor for FDI in the 
following years. Foreign direct investment continued to play a prominent role in 
the CEE region and in cohesion countries also. Certain new trends can be 
detected however in - and outflows. Apart from that, registration of FDI also 
changed. 
Regarding the CEE countries there are considerable fluctuations of FDI inflow 
which are caused by some large privatization deals. This is to a certain extent true 
for Spain also. In the Czech Republic, in 2001-2002, big banks and the gas 
company were privatized and in 2005 the local telecommunication company was 
sold to the Spanish Telefónica. In Slovakia the privatisation of the electricity and 
gas sector raised the FDI inflow to an outstanding level in 2002 (Elteto, 2010) 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2. FDI in percentage of GDP during 2001-2010 
Country    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  2009  2010 
Flow  5.98  5.8  10.49 14.01 14.43 24.35  29.4  19.02  6.88  4.53  Bulgaria 
Stock 21.66 26.12 31.88 41.01 50.95 74.06 90.08 84.89 100.95 100.2
2 
Flow  9.12  11.28  2.21  4.55 9.3 3.82  5.99  2.99 1.54 3.53  Czech 
Republic  Stock 43.81 51.37 49.57 52.28 48.64 55.83 64.52 52.37  66.15  67.64 
Flow 7.38 4.49 2.53 4.41 6.97 6.67 2.87 4.75  1.59  1.84  Hungary 
Stock 51.42 54.37 57.25 61.25 56.08  72.7  69.23 56.95  76.7  71.02 
Flow 3.00 2.08 2.25 5.05 3.37 5.75 5.54  2.8  3.18  2.07  Poland 
Stock 21.66 24.38 26.68 34.27 29.86 36.84 41.97 31.04  43.22  41.22 
Flow 2.88 2.49 3.69 8.52 6.55 9.27 5.82 6.81  3.01  2.24  Romania 
Stock 20.75 17.12 20.51 27.13 26.10 37.06  36.9  33.23  44.69  43.94 
Flow 7.5 16.89  6.55 7.21 5.12 8.52 4.77 4.96 -0.06  0.6  Slovakia 
Stock 26.45 34.78  44.2  52.07 49.88 61.01 56.86  54  60.1  58.09 
Flow 1.83 7.14 1.07 2.49 1.67 1.69  3.2  3.56 -1.18 1.75  Slovenia 
Stock 12.87 18.24 22.29 22.87  20.6  23.52 30.38 28.62  30.77  31.47 
Flow 4.66 5.72 2.92 2.37 2.21 3.00 4.46 4.83  0.62  1.75  Spain 
Stock  29.1  37.46 38.44 39.02 34.04 37.43 40.63 36.95  43.37  43.68 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database. 
 
Between 2001-2003 most countries faced a decrease in FDIs, because the 
privatization process slowed down. There was practically no privatisation at this 
time, and wages and labour costs increased. There were also some 
disinvestments towards China and other Asian countries. In 2004-2005 FDI 
inflows increased again, which can be the effect of the EU accession. 
Reinvested earnings became more and more significant (in Poland also between 
2004-2007, together with the increase of FDI from the EU). The Bulgarian 
privatization lasted to late 2008 and attracted the largest FDI inflows in the entire  FDIs and investment policy in some European countries 
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region. In Romania this process accelerated after 2004. Most of the total FDI 
stock comes from the EU and about 50% of the total stock stems from just three 
countries: Austria, the Netherlands and Germany. Privatisation-related FDI, 
which used to be significant in sectors like public utilities (gas, electricity, 
telecommunications), banking and the construction sector, represented half of 
total FDI stocks. Slovenia has the lowest penetration of FDI among the observed 
countries. Here the privatisation policy was more cautious towards foreign 
owners (Elteto, 2010). But only in Slovenia and the Czech Republic we can see 
that in 2010 the FDI decreasing trend reversed just like in Spain. 
The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU in 2004. They have 
tried to adjust the EU economic policies and they work to adapt to the open 
market economy. Their FDI levels are lower than in the other developed member 
states, but the situation changed after their EU accession. By adopting the euro, 
most of the countries began to use the same currency and it makes the trade 
easier and more efficient. When we look at Slovenia and Slovakia, Slovakia has 
higher levels in economic indicators than Slovenia. On the other hand, Slovenia 
has the worst inflow and outflow levels among all member states. It is less 
developed than the others. Also, the GDP is not good as in the others. These 
countries need some developments. If there is no more investment in one 
country, the other economic factors cannot be improved. To join the union is not 
enough. There should be new policy areas, innovations. These countries are 
under the European Union FDI average and the resources must be used 
efficiently, because the natural resources and FDI have a strong correlation. The 
new markets like Far East Asia and Latin America cause a decrease in FDI 
inflows but an increase in outflows (Osafoğlu et al., 2008).  
Spain became member of the European Union in 1986 and its economic growth 
began to increase by 1990’s. According to statistics, FDI inflows in Spain were 
few before 2003, below Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. In contrast to 
inflows, FDI outflows have always been more in Spain. Portugal joined the EU in 
1986 with Spain. FDI inflows and outflows were not the same in Portugal. The 
outflows were always much more larger than inflows and this situation has 
continued after 2006.  
Hungary, which became a member of EU in 2004, has unstable FDI rates. The 
FDI inflows increased after 2004, but in 2006-2007 decreased again. Still, the 
FDI outflows were few. 
In Lithuania, in the ‘90s the rates of FDI inflows were low, but as a result of the 
accession to EU, the numbers peaked in 2004 and were maximum in 2006, but 
the outflow percentages were also increased significantly in 2006.  Magdalena RĂDULESCU, Elena Nolica DRUICĂ 
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In Latvia, the number has increased year by year. In 2004 it doubled. In 2005 
there was not a big increase but in 2006-2007 the FDI inflows reached their 
peak. The FDI outflows was minimum between 1990 and 2000 but it started to 
develop after 2003.  
Poland, which became a member in 2004, tripled its FDI stock in 2004. However 
in 2005 it showed a decline, but it again got better in 2006-2008. The outflow 
stocks of Poland have experienced an important development during the last two 
decades.  
In Estonia the FDI percentages have increased suddenly between 1990 and 
2006. The outflow has increased ten times between 1990 and 2008.  
Greece joined the EU in 1981 with the second enlargement. The FDI inflows 
increased after 2004 and the inflows were twice as much as outflows, although 
the latter increased in the last two decades. 
Cyprus and Malta joined the European Union in 2004. The FDI levels are not as 
competitive as its brothers. Malta’s FDI inflow percentages increased five times 
during 1990 to 2006. Just like inflow also the outflow percentages raised during 
2004 and 2006 from negative levels to small positive numbers until 2007-2008. 
Cyprus’s FDI inflow percentages doubled until 2007. The FDI outflows increased 
seven times until 2007, but they represents half of the FDI inflows.  
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Both states FDI inflow levels 
increased two or three times after 2007. In 2005 when Bulgaria reached its 
highest FDI outflow percentage 5.0%, Romania reached its lowest percentage as 
- 0.1% in 2005 and -0,05% in 2009 (Osafoğlu et al., 2008).  
3.  CHALLENGES DURING THE CRISIS PERIOD 
The EU membership of the CEE countries increased their popularity among 
foreign investors. Later, as a consequence of the worldwide recession, inward 
and outward investments decreased. The extent was however different among 
the countries. The signs of the global financial crisis appeared in 2007 but the 
severe eruption happened in 2008 combined with economic and structural crisis. 
The effects were felt in 2009 and even later. FDI reacted later and to less extent. 
The decrease of FDI has been mainly felt in certain branches such as the 
automotive industries, which suffered from the structural crisis. In the CEE 
countries automotive industry is important as a consequence of the significant 
export platforms created by foreign capital in the last twenty years. The declining 
demand hit this industry in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic. In Hungary  FDIs and investment policy in some European countries 
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inward FDI decreased significantly in 2009. The trend could be also seen in 
Cyprus. In the Czech Republic the inflow of EU funds helped to maintain the 
external balance and the banking sector behave relatively well. The fiscal deficit 
increased but the adequate policy measures helped to stimulate the economy 
(Elteto, 2010). 
Slovakia was in the recent years eminent in the CEE region, with growth rates of 
10 per cent in 2007 and 7 per cent even in 2008, and introduced the euro in 
2009. However, Slovakia’s reliance on the car industry (which accounts for 20 
per cent of GDP) means that exports suffered a lot in 2009 and FDI decreased 
drastically. 
Polish inward FDI did not decrease significantly in 2009. Poland’s strength is the 
size of its domestic market, which makes it less dependent on exports than the 
smaller countries. Also, its industrial base is more diversified and less dependent 
on a single (like car) industry. Perhaps more than other new member states, 
Poland could benefit from the return of highly skilled workers and from 
infrastructure investments co-financed by structural funds. 
Bulgaria was severely hit by the crisis, GDP decreased by 5% in 2009. Inward 
foreign direct investment also decreased to around half of the sum in the 
previous year. Exports, imports and manufacturing production also declined. 
In Romania, besides the crisis, the general economic background worsened. 
Foreign investors were attracted so far by relatively low unit labour cost, 
proximity to the euro area, sound macroeconomic fundamentals (successful 
disinflation, high growth) and by domestic market potential. However, the boom 
of privatisation-led FDI, which represented about half of the FDI inflows in the 
past years, is now largely over. Furthermore, Romania's low-cost advantage is 
gradually eroding in certain sectors. Only at the beginning of 2011, we achieved 
again the economic growth and the Romanian economy has again became 
attractive for the foreign investors. 
A tightening labour market and skill shortages, partly due to large migration, 
have contributed to significant increases in private sector wages, which are 
growing by about 20% annually (Ionita and Pauwels, 2008). Wage developments 
have outstripped productivity growth in the last two years, which has led to a 
sharp appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, adversely affecting 
Romania's international competitiveness. 
The Spanish economy was affected by the crisis later than other large 
economies, but the effects were similarly severe. Inward FDI began to lose 
momentum in the second half of 2008. In 2008 the United Kingdom was the main  Magdalena RĂDULESCU, Elena Nolica DRUICĂ 
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investor (45,8%) followed by Germany (26%). France and Spanish affiliates 
abroad are also important investors in Spain but mainly via the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. Outward Spanish investments decreased in 2008 compared to 
2007, which was an outstanding year. In 2009 both the inward and outward FDI 
decreased significantly compared to the previous year. However, Spanish 
multinationals gained more weight in the last few years. Spanish companies own 
the largest mobile telephone company in the UK, operate three lines of the 
London underground and own several of the country’s largest airports, two 
Spanish banks dominate the Latin American banking sector, bought important 
banks in the UK and Inditex is the world’s second largest fashion retailer by 
number of shops (Chislett, 2010). Thirteen Spanish companies are included in 
the 2009 Financial Times Global 500 ranking of the world’s biggest companies 
(from the CEE countries there is only one Czech firm in the list). The expansion 
abroad has enabled corporate Spain, in general, to treat the global recession 
much better than had companies relying solely on their home market. This is 
particularly true of the infrastructure sector and the big commercial banks. 
Spain’s large construction companies won business abroad in 2009. Banco 
Santander generated considerable profit in 2009 in Latin America and in the UK, 
while Mexico provided close to one-quarter of BBVA’s profit (Chislett, 2010). 
When the global financial crisis struck and the very favorable international credit 
conditions suddenly disappeared, the Spanish economy began an inevitable 
adjustment process, with a substantial reduction in consumption and investment 
by 2008, when housing investment plummeted. This adjustment helped to 
correct the excessive indebtedness of the private sector led however to a large 
decrease in economic activity, with GDP growth in 2009 at around -3.6%. At the 
same time, the work of automatic stabilizers, the loss of the revenue windfalls 
obtained during the expansion and the expansionary fiscal programs put in place 
by the government to mitigate the effects of the crisis have led to a very rapid 
deterioration of public accounts, which moved from a surplus of around 2% of 
GDP in 2007 to deficits of around 4% and 11% in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
Altogether, the Spanish economy very quickly reduced its need for external 
financing as its current account deficit decreased from around 10% of GDP in 
2008 to around 6% in 2009, being now mostly driven by fiscal deficits rather than 
by private indebtedness as in the expansionary phase. 
The empiric results of Gavilán et al., 2009, indicate that, in line with Izquierdo, 
Jimeno and Rojas (2010), interest rates and demographic changes are mainly 
responsible for the investment boom and the build-up of a sizable external 
imbalance (measured as the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP) witnessed in the  FDIs and investment policy in some European countries 
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Spanish economy during the expansionary phase. In this context, they find a 
very limited role for fiscal policy in reducing the external imbalance accumulated 
in Spain over the period 1998-2008.  
The framework set out in this paper has also been used to analyze the different 
policy options faced by the Spanish economy after the crisis. Several results are 
worth mentioning. First, even without the arrival of the crisis, in the medium and 
long run the Spanish economy would have entered into a phase of lower GDP 
growth when the external imbalance of the economy would have been reduced 
but when public accounts would have deteriorated. This process, mostly driven 
by the aging of the Spanish population, a factor that is common to most 
industrialized countries, became more pronounced with global financial crisis. 
Second, the model highlights the relevance of the fiscal policy and of structural 
reforms in the post-crisis scenario. Frontloading in fiscal consolidation would 
contribute to public accounts’ sustainability and to mitigate the output losses 
induced by the crisis on medium term. In addition, policies aimed at improving 
competition help in reducing short and medium term output losses, while 
inducing a positive long-run effect on the level of output. In light of the 
complementarities between these policies, the recovery of economic activity in 
Spain after the crisis could be more successful and less costly if they were 
implemented together. 
Bucking the general downward trend of FDI inflows in 2008, some EMU 
countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia) recorded an increase in FDI 
inflows. Also the Czech Republic in the CEE region attracted more FDI in 2010 
by using budgetary spending to support them. Inward FDI to Spain more than 
doubled, to $66 billion, driven by several high-value cross-border M&As, such as 
the $18 billion acquisition of the Spanish Cigarette producer Altadis by British 
Imperial Tobacco. FDI inflows also increased in Greece (by 166% to $5.1 billion), 
Slovenia (by 26% to $1.8 billion) and Portugal (by 16% to $3.5 billion). Spain 
ranked fourth among the first 10 recipient developed countries (UNCTAD, 2009). 
The outward FDI fell to $837 billion in 2008, representing a sharp decline of 30%. 
As a result, the EU countries’ share in total outward FDI from developed 
countries dropped to 56% from 66% in 2007. A large fall in equity investments 
and net divestments in the form of intra-company loans contributed the most to 
the decline.  
In 2008-2009, the bulk of policy changes in the CEE region were more 
favourable to foreign investors. Some countries continued to liberalize FDI 
regulations in certain industries. Even in the crisis period, the CEE region is very  Magdalena RĂDULESCU, Elena Nolica DRUICĂ 
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attractive for the foreign investors. One, if not the biggest location advantage of 
the CEE Region compared to Western Europe is the unchanged excellent ratio 
of productivity to costs of hired labour. Top seven of the most attractive CEE 
countries shows that Russia is the first, followed by Ukraine, Romania, Turkey, 
Poland, Belarus, Croatia. Many CEE countries cut down their tax levels to 
stimulate investments. Bulgaria has the lowest tax on profit and VAT in the 
region and Romania and Poland are among the countries with the lowest tax 
levels. Unfortunately, both Bulgaria and Romania couldn’t sustain this fiscal 
policy with budgetary spending to support investments and FDI decreased. 
Moreover, in Romania the social and political framework has worsened and the 
foreign investors became reticent toward investing here.   
The majority of German, Austrian and Swiss entrepreneurs appreciate the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) as being extremely attractive as 
sales markets and production locations – in spite of the economic crisis and the 
increasing role of China and India. Romania in particular was nominated by the 
business people as being the third most surprisingly attractive country, after 
Russia and Ukraine. Today more than half of the production businesses of 
Austrian, German and Swiss companies are set on the mature CEE-5 markets 
and in the Baltic States. Over 20% of the business locations are to be found in 
the new EU member states Romania and Bulgaria, while the rest spread in the 
remaining Southern Europe and the GUS-States. Looking into the future we see 
companies primarily planning to develop their business activities in the GUS 
states Russia and Ukraine, which are closely followed by Romania, in the third 
place. The continuously high attractiveness of Romania consists in its interesting 
mixture of cheap production factors and markets that have partially not been 
saturated yet, as well as of sufficient political and legal stability – advantages 
over several other CEE countries. The margin pressure and the competition on 
the mature CEE-markets like the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia become 
tougher and disparities between these areas and Western Europe as far as 
products, distribution, advertising and pricing are concerned seem to be in 
decline (Horvath and Parteners, 2010). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In the late nineties the economic and political transition in the CEE countries was in 
its end phase. Spain and Portugal had already a decade of membership in the 
European Union. FDI played an essential developing role in both cases. In the last 
decade, their integration in both cases strengthened by entering the EMU and the 
EU. With respect to FDI we cannot speak about massive inflows yet, but large  FDIs and investment policy in some European countries 
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single deals can determine the amount of yearly inflow in all countries. In the CEE 
countries, outward FDI became more and more significant. In cohesion countries 
outflows started much before, but also became more intensive (Elteto, 2010). One 
major concern of developing countries is how to retain existing investment and 
attract new FDI during the present global recession. Economic stimulation 
programmes can be an incentive for foreign investment, but many developing 
countries do not have the financial resources to successfully compete with the 
investment promotion packages of developed countries. Moreover, incentive-based 
competition for foreign investment may risk lowering social and environmental 
standards, which would be detrimental to sustainable development (Arabi, 2010). 
Once the privatization is over in this region, once the advantage of the low labor 
unit cost has eroded, the investment programmes for infrastructure may have a 
positive effect on inward foreign investment provided that they are designed in a 
non-discriminatory manner and open to foreign investors, just like the Spanish 
experience shows. From a policy perspective, it would appear that the right 
approach by governments concerned with attracting foreign direct investment is to 
use the European funds granted by the EU, to lower corruption and to keep taxes 
low but to maintain investment in infrastructure rather than using revenue for 
consumption expenditures and to mix the fiscal policy with the budgetary spending 
to support investments (Goodspeed et al., 2006).  
This increased competition for FDI challenges both in the cohesion countries and 
in the CEE countries. Many (but not all) of these countries have tried to compete 
globally on the basis of two primary location advantages: low labour costs and 
EU membership. As we have discussed above, EU membership is not as much 
of an advantage in a liberalized, stable and shrinking world where distance does 
not form as much of a barrier to trade and investment as it once did. For similar 
reasons, the cost advantage of these countries has also been dissipated in many 
cases, particularly where productivity gains in China and other Asian economies 
have grown partly as a result of their superior technological infrastructure. Spain 
and Portugal have experienced some displacement of FDI or lost sequential FDI 
because they have not been able to develop location advantages in knowledge- 
and capital-intensive activities to compensate for the rising labour costs that 
have eroded their industrial base in low-value-adding activities, a development 
that also has been observed in CEE countries, where already some production 
activities have been shifted “further east”. 
In other words, the most obvious long-term solution for cohesion countries is to 
improve their location advantages in other areas, towards more science-based 
technological sectors. Ireland has succeeded in doing so with its focus on the  Magdalena RĂDULESCU, Elena Nolica DRUICĂ 
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ICT sectors, although Portugal and Spain have so far failed to make significant 
moves towards more science-based sectors. Beyond the fact that science-based 
sectors and knowledge-intensive activities fit the current comparative advantage 
of these countries, they are also less footloose. This is partly because these 
sectors tend to rely on location-specific and location-bound assets that are less 
easily substitutable. 
The economies with the most successful technological upgrading – the 
developing Asian countries – allocated subsidies in what Amsden and Hikino 
(2000) call a “reciprocal control mechanism”. That is, incentives and subsidies, 
whether to upgrade technologically, promote local content, expand exports or 
reduce import-dependence were subject to performance standards that were 
actively monitored, and in Amsden’s words, were “redistributive in nature and 
results-oriented” and acted to prevent government failure. 
The biggest challenge is that of institutional restructuring, and the move – 
especially for the CEE countries – away from state ownership of key sectors, and 
state-defined priorities, which have been achieved in the CEE economies to 
different degrees, partly as a result of specific funds made available to these 
countries by the European Commission. On the other hand, these countries are 
also limited in their competition for FDI by EU policies, particularly those 
associated with regulation, competition and state aid. 
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